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Forum Juridicum
THE RIGHT OF APPEAL*
John T. Hood, Jr.**
Practically every appellate court in the United States has used
the words, "The right of appeal is favored," 1 and "Statutes
should be liberally construed in furtherance of that right. '2 The
courts in Louisiana have gone a little further. They have held
that the right of appeal is a "constitutional right, '8 that it is a
"fundamental safeguard of justice,"' 4 that an appeal must be
maintained whenever possible,5 and that it can be dismissed
"only for substantial causes. ' 6
Although great importance has been attached to the right of
appeal, our Federal Constitution does not guaranty any such
right. The United States Appellate Courts have held that the
remedy of appeal actually is not a "right" at all in the constitu-
tional sense, and that Congress or any state may refuse to pro-
vide such a remedy.
Many legal students today wonder why the framers of our
Constitution did not incorporate into that document the grant
* A paper delivered on May 4, 1968, at ceremonies inducting the writer as an
honorary member of the Order of the Coif at 'the Law School, Touisiana State Uni-
versity, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
** Judge, Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, State of Louisiana. The writer
acknowledges his indebtedness for research and editorial assistance to Hon. Russell
A. Gaudin, law clerk for the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, 1967-68, now a mem-
ber of the Baton Rouge Bar.
1. See, e.g., In re Goddard's Estate, 176 Kan. 495, 271 P.2d 759 (1954) ; Mer-
cer v. Federal Land Bank of Louisville, 300 Ky. 311, 188 S.W.2d 489 (1945) ;
Viser v. Viser, 243 La. 706, 146 So.2d 409 (1962) ; State ex rel. Weiss v. Mori-
arity, 203 Minn. 23, 279 N.W. 835 (1938) ; In re Moore's Estate, 354 Mo. 240, 189
S.W.2d 229 (1945) ; 'State v. I-lammerquist, 67 S.D. 417, 293 N.W. 539 (1940).
2. In re Madonia, 32 F. Supp. 165 (E.D. Ill. 1940) ; St. Louis Southwestern
Ry. v. Harrist, 241 Ark. 173, 406 S.W.2d 694 (1966) ; Wilbur v. Cull, 127 Cal.
App. 2d 655, 274 P.2d 424 (1954) ; Schoutens v. Superior Court in and for Los
Angeles County, 97 Cal. App. 2d 855, 218 P.2d 999 (1950) ; Mid-State Homes, Inc.
v. Davis, 169 So.2d 404 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) ; Phillips v. West, 139 So.2d
274 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962) ; Farmers Supply Co. v. Williams, 107 So.2d 544(La. App. 2d Cir. 1958) ; In re Moore's Estate, 354 Mo. 240, 189 S.W.2d 229(1945); Dirkmann v. Associates Discount Corp., 410 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. App.
1966) ; Ilallahan v. Riley, 94 N.H. 338, 53 A.2d 431 (1947) ; McKenzie v. Ohio
State Racing Comm'n, 5 Ohio St.2d 229, 215 N.E.2d 397 (1966).
3. See, e.g., Harnishchfeger Corp. v. C. W. Greeson Co., 219 La. 546, 53 So.2d
488 (1951) ; State ex rel. Harvey v. Ristroph, 3 So.2d 202 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941);
Dorfer v. City of Natchitoches, 160 So. 807 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935).
4. Jackson v. Kellogg Lumber Co., 14 So.2d 311 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1943).
5. Emmons v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 245 La. 411, 158 So.2d 594 (1963).
6. General Motors Accept. Corp. v. Deep South Pest Control, Inc., 247 La.
625, 173 So.2d 190 (1965).
7. Tinkoff v. United States, 86 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1937) ; United States v. St.
Clair, 42 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1930) ; Williams v. United States, 1 F.2d 203 (8th
Cir. 1924) ; United States v. Marrone, 172 F. Supp. 368 (D.C. Alaska 1959).
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of such a right, and this inquiry prompted me to select as the
subject of this discussion the background of some of our exist-
ing laws relating to appeals.
The right of appeal is strictly of civil law origin., It was
totally unknown to the common law.9 It exists today only where
it is specifically granted by constitutional or statutory
authority.10
Under common law procedures, and with very few excep-
tions, the review of a trial court judgment could be obtained
only if the unsuccessful litigant applied for and was granted a
"writ of error."'1 This common law "writ of error" differed in
many ways from the civil law right of appeal. The most im-
portant differences were that in civil law jurisdictions the liti-
gant had the absolute right to appeal, the appellate court re-
viewed both the law and the facts, and the appeal was con-
sidered as a continuation of the same case in a superior re-
viewing court.12 At common law the litigant did not have an
absolute right to have his case reviewed, it being discretionary
with the higher court whether such a review should be granted.
If a writ of error was allowed the reviewing authority was
empowered to review only questions of law. And, in common
law proceedings the application for a writ of error was not con-
sidered as a continuation of the same case, but instead it was
regarded as an entirely separate proceeding. 13
8. See Buessel v. United States, 258 F. 811 (2d Cir. 1919) ; 4 C.J.S. Appeal
& Error § 18 (1964).
9. American Life Ins. Co. v. Powell, 259 Ala. 70, 65 So. 516 (1953) ; Robin-
son v. Clements, 409 S.W.2d 215 (Mo. 1966) ; From v. Sutton, 156 Neb. 411, 56
N.W.2d 441 (1953) ; Hager v. Weber, 7 N.J. 201, 81 A.2d 155 (1951) ; Warren v.
City of Cincinnati, 113 Ohio App. 254, 173 N.E.2d 180 (1959) 4 C.J.S. Appeal
& Error §§ 8, 18(a), 39 (1964).
10. Drury v. Franke, 247 Ky. 758, 57 S.W.2d 969 (1933) ; In re Tutorship
of Kitchen, 162 So.2d 826 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) ; Stith v. St. Louis Public
Serv. Co., 363 Mo. 442, 251 S.W.2d 693 (1952) ; Guenther v. Funk, 67 N.D. 543,
274 N.W. 839 (1937) ; Rea v. Rea, 195 Ore. 252, 245 P.2d 884 (1952) ; 28 U.S.C.§ 1291 (1964) ; LA. CONST. art. VII, § 29; 4 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 18 (1964)
4 Am. JuR. 2d Appeal & Error §§ 2, 4, (1964).
11. See generally A. CARTER, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH COURTS (7th ed.
1944) ; G. CPRRA, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 185 (1.829) ; T. PLUCKNETT, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (4th ed. 1948) ; 2 F. POLLOCK & F.
MIAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 664 (2d ed. 1898) ; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 245, 643 (7th ed. 1956) ; L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL
APPEALS IN AMERICA 22-31 (1939).
12. Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890) ; Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 321 (1796) ; Buessel v. United States, 258 F. 811 (2d Cir. 1919) ; State
v. Hardy, 339 Mo. 897, 98 S.W. 2d 593 (1936) ; BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 125
4th ed. 1951) ; 4 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 17 (1964).
13. Sohland v. Baker, 15 Del. Ch. 431, 141 A. 277 (1927) ; People v. Barber,
348 Ill. 40, 180 N.E. 633 (1932) ; BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 125 (4th ed. 1951) ; 4
C.J.S. APPEAL & ERROR §§ 9, 17, 21(b) (1964).
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Several years before our Federal Constitution was drafted,
the Continental Congress showed an inclination to depart from
the old common law procedures by authorizing a legal remedy
which corresponds to the civil law right of appeal. This oc-
curred during the American Revolution.
General Washington, as Commander in Chief of the Con-
tinental forces, sent vessels out to prey upon British supply
ships which were en route to beseiged Boston. A number of
British ships were captured and they were claimed by Ameri-
cans as prizes of war. All sorts of conflicting claims arose out
of these captures, and these disputes were referred to General
Washington for settlement. In 1775 Washington wrote to the
Continental Congress suggesting that courts be established to
decide these disputes, 14 and in response to that request, Con-
gress adopted a resolution recommending that each of the
colonial states establish courts and procedures to adjudicate
claims arising out of captures on the high seas. The resolution
stipulated that all such trials were to be by jury, and that ap-
peals could be taken directly from the state courts to the Con-
tinental Congress."5
The state governments objected to that part of the resolu-
tion which provided that appeals could be taken from state
courts to the Congress. They felt that it threatened the sover-
eignty of the states. And, in a few cases, where Congress re-
versed the decisions of the state courts, the states refused to
respect the decrees rendered by Congress.10
This occurred in the famous Olmstead case.17 The facts there
were that a sailor named Olmstead, and three companions, while
being held as prisoners on a British ship, overcame the master
and crew and they seized the vessel. As they were bringing the
ship in, and when actually in sight of a New Jersey harbor,
they were overtaken and forceably brought into a Philadelphia
port by a ship belonging to the State of Pennsylvania. Olm-
stead claimed the British ship as a prize of war, but the Penn-
sylvania trial court awarded him only one-fourth the prize
money. The rest of the money was awarded to Pennsylvania and
to other claimants. Olmstead appealed to the Continental Con-
gress which reversed the state court and awarded the total
14. S. BLOOM, FORMATION OF THE UNION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 347,
744 (1941).
15. Id. at 348.
16. Id.; The United States v. Judge Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809).
17. The United States v. Judge Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809).
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amount to Olmstead and his crew. The State of Pennsylvania
had already collected the money, however, and it refused to give
it up. When the federal marshall tried to collect the amount of
the judgment for Olmstead he was met by Pennsylvania state
militiamen. Olmstead continued his litigation for the prize money
due him, and he finally succeeded in collecting it 33 years
later, when he was 83 years of age."'
When the State of Pennsylvania and other states refused to
respect these judicial decrees of the Continental Congress, the
Congress asserted its authority and adopted a strongly worded
resolution declaring that it, or any tribunal appointed by it,
had the power to re-examine the facts and the law in any de-
cision of a state court involving captures on the high seas. A part
of that resolution reads like this: "No finding of a jury in any
court of admiralty . . . can or ought to destroy the right of
appeal and the re-examination of the facts reserved to Congress:
[and] . . . no act of any state can or ought to destroy the right
of appeals to Congress in the sense above declared."' 19
Congress first appointed a committee of five members to
hear and adjudicate these appeals, and later, in 1780, it created
a court consisting of three judges which was called "The Court
of Appeals in Cases of Capture.' ' 20 This new court was empow-
ered to hear all appeals from the state courts in admiralty cases.
It was the first national appellate court. It was created seven
years before the Constitutional Convention convened, and the
procedure for appeal was patterned after the civil law.
When the Constitutional Convention met in 1787, battle lines
were formed almost immediately between the Federalists and
Anti-Federalists.21 The former felt that a strong national gov-
ernment should be formed, and the Anti-Federalists believed in
maintaining the sovereignty of the states. Early in the Conven-
tion these two groups took sharp issue over a proposal that the
new constitution contain a provision for the establishment of an
independent national judiciary, including trial courts. The Fed-
eralists favored such a plan, while the Anti-Federalists opposed
it. The latter group felt that the establishment of an independent
national judiciary would vest too much power in the federal
government. They agreed that there should be a national Su-
18. See E. BATES, TnE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 107 (chart. ed. 1962).
19. S. BLOOM, FORMATION OF THE UNION UNDER TElE CONSTITUTION 348
(1941).
20. Id. at 349.
21. See id. at 350.
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preme Court, but they proposed that there be no federal trial
courts at all, that all cases be tried in state trial courts and that
appeals be authorized from the state courts to the United States
Supreme Court only when federal questions are involved.
There were five important questions relating to the judiciary
which confronted the delegates to this convention. The manner
in which those questions eventually were answered has had a
tremendous effect on the development of our present form of
government and on our society. These questions were: (1)
Should a complete system of federal courts be established, sep-
arate and independent from the state courts? (2) Should the
United States Supreme Court have the power to annul an act
of Congress on the grounds that it is unconstitutional? (3)
Should that court have the power to annul an act of a state
legislature? (4) Should an absolute right of appeal to a super-
ior tribunal be guaranteed to a litigant? and (5) Should appel-
late courts be granted the right to review facts as well as the
law in cases appealed to them?
Although all five of these questions were considered by the
Convention, the debates which took place centered largely around
the first three: Whether an independent federal judiciary
should be established, whether the Supreme Court should be
empowered to annul acts of Congress, and whether that Court
should have the power to annul acts of state legislatures.22
The delegates were unable to resolve their differences on
any of these three questions, and it appeared for a while that
the Convention would not be able to agree on a proposed con-
stitution. Since no other solution could be found, the delegates
finally decided to omit entirely from the Constitution any pro-
visions relating to these three important questions, and instead
to leave the determination of these controversial issues to Con-
gress.
It is probable that the proposed constitution would not have
been ratified by all of the thirteen states if it had contained
provisions relating to the establishment of an independent fed-
eral judiciary or stipulations indicating that federal courts could
annul acts of Congress or acts of the state legislatures. Several
states almost refused to ratify the proposed constitution even
though these controversial provisions had been eliminated from
it. New York, for instance, ratified the Constitution by a
22. Id. at 354.
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majority of only three votes. In New Hampshire and Virginia,
it passed with majorities of ten votes, and in Massachusetts it
carried by a majority of only 19 votes.23
The Constitution which was approved by the Convention and
which eventually was ratified by the states created only one
court, the Supreme Court, and it authorized Congress to create
"such inferior courts as it may from time to time ordain and
establish. ' 2 4
It did not specify how many justices should be on the Supreme
Court or how they were to be selected. It did not stipulate what
types of inferior courts should be created, if any, or what the
jurisdiction of those courts should be. It did not specify that
there should be federal trial courts. And, it contained no pro-
visions at all relating to the question of whether the Supreme
Court could annul acts of Congress or acts of state legislatures.
Although the Constitution, as finally ratified by the states,
made no determination of the above-mentioned issues, it did
contain other important provisions pertaining to the judiciary.
It provided that the Supreme Court should have original juris-
diction in four types of controversies, 25 and that it should have
appellate jurisdiction in a very limited number of other types of
cases. 21 By using the term "appellate jurisdiction," the framers
of the Constitution intimated that at least in some cases a liti-
gant should have an absolute right of appeal to the Supreme
Court, as provided in civil law jurisdictions. 27 And, the Consti-
tution specifically provided that in cases over which the Supreme
Court was given appellate jurisdiction, its jurisdiction was to
be "both as to Law and Fact," such a provision obviously having
been taken from civil law procedures.28 The appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court, however, although limited to start with,
was further restricted by the provision that it was subject to
"such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress
shall make.
2 9
Tremendous power relating to the judiciary was vested in
Congress. It not only could create and control completely all
23. Id. at 26, 60.
24. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
25. Id. § 2.
26. See Id.
27. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton) in which Hamilton said: "A
technical sense has been fixed to the term 'appellate' which, in our law parlance,
is commonly used in reference to appeals in the course of civil law."
28. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2; THE FEDERtIzST No. 81 (A. Hamilton).
29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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inferior courts, but it also could control the Supreme Court.
It, in practical effect, could actually abolish the Supreme Court
through its unlimited authority to regulate and restrict its juris-
diction and to determine the number of justices who were to
be on the court and how they were to be selected.
When the first Congress convened in 1789, the Senate ap-
pointed a committee of eight members "to bring in a bill for
organizing the judiciary of the United States. 3 0 Six of the
eight members of the committee were lawyers. Three of them
had served as judges before Congress convened, and five of
them had been members of the Constitutional Convention.
The committee undertook to answer the three controversial
questions which the Constitutional Convention had left un-
answered: Whether an independent system of federal courts
should be established, whether the Supreme Court should have
the power to annul acts of Congress, and whether that court
should have authority to annul acts of the state legislatures.
The Federalist leaders in the Senate favored all three of these
proposals, while the Anti-Federalist leaders lined up against
them. After much debate the Federalist view prevailed, and the
committee, by a vote of five to three, decided to report a bill
to the Senate which provided for a complete independent system
of federal courts and which vested a great deal of power in the
Supreme Court.
The bill was debated for almost four weeks in the Senate,
and about an equal length of time in the House of Represen-
tatives. It was amended 63 times.3 1
The Federalists had a substantial majority of the votes in
both the Senate and in the House, so the bill eventually passed
by a vote of about two to one in both houses. It was signed by
President Washington in 1789.
The Judiciary Act 32 which emerged from the first session
of Congress established a complete and independent federal
judiciary. It created a Supreme Court consisting of a Chief
Justice and five Associate Justices. Thirteen district courts were
created, with one district judge to be appointed for each such
court. Three circuit courts were established, but these courts
30. S. BLOOM, FORMATION OF T1HE UNION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 353
(1941).
31. Id. at 362.
32. 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
[Vol. XXIX
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were not to be staffed with separate judges. Each circuit court
was to consist of two justices of the Supreme Court and one
district judge. The act required that a session of the circuit
court be held in each of the thirteen districts at least twice a
year, and since two justices of the Supreme Court had to sit on
each such court, it became necessary for the justices to do a
great deal of travelling throughout the thirteen states. The re-
quirement that the justices do this travelling and sit with the
circuit courts became so burdensome that in 1793 the act was
amended to require that only one justice was required to sit with
a district judge in order to constitute a circuit court.3 3 The
famous trial of Aaron Burr took place in such a court.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 vested in the Supreme Court
greater jurisdiction than was authorized in the Constitution.
It gave that court, for instance, the power to issue writs of
mandamus, when no such authority had been granted by the
Constitution. It required the justices to sit as members of
circuit courts in the original trial of cases, although the Con-
stitution provided that except for a few types of controversies
the Supreme Court had only "appellate jurisdiction." And, in
spite of the fact that the Constitution limited the court generally
to appellate jurisdiction, the act at least implied that the Supreme
Court was to try some cases since it provided that "the trial of
issues in fact in the Supreme Court, in all actions at law against
citizens of the United States, shall be by jury."
The Judiciary Act also provided that the Supreme Court
should have appellate jurisdiction in certain cases over the
circuit courts "and courts of the several states." It specifically
stipulated that a final judgment in the highest court of a state
which upholds the constitutionality of a state statute "may be
re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court
of the United States upon a writ of error. '3 4 And it went on to
provide that when the judgment of a state court should be re-
versed by the Supreme Court, then instead of remanding the
cause for a final decision as was the required procedure when
decisions of circuit courts were reversed, the Supreme Court
could, in its discretion, "proceed to a final decision of the same,
and award execution."
By the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789, therefore,
33. 1 Stat. 333 (1789).




the First Congress settled two of the five controversial ques-
tions relating to the judiciary which had been left unanswered
by the Constitutional Convention. It established a complete
system of federal courts, separate and independent from the
state courts, and it specifically vested in the United States
Supreme Court the power to annul acts of the state legislatures
on constitutional grounds. 35 The act, however, did not provide
a clear-cut or lasting answer to any of the other three related
questions which were before the Congress. It, for instance, con-
tained no provisions at all indicating whether the Supreme
Court could annul acts of Congress. It granted an absolute right
of appeal in some admiralty and maritime cases, but generally
the only procedure for review provided in the act was one pat-
terned on the old common law discretionary writ of error. And,
it provided that in a case where a writ of error was granted
the reviewing court was specifically prohibited from reversing
"for any error in fact." As will be pointed out later the two
provisions last mentioned were soon revised.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 has now acquired a status almost
as exalted as the Constitution itself. 36 But regardless of how that
act may be regarded now, it was unpopular and was much crit-
icized shortly after it was enacted.
Representative Jackson of Georgia declared it an outrage on
"the poor man." Sumpter of South Carolina saw it as "the iron
hand of power." Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire de-
nounced it as "a new-fangled system." Senator Maclay, of Penn-
sylvania, who was one of the three dissenters in the Senate
Committtee which proposed the bill, called it "the gunpowder
pot of the Constitution [designed to] swallow all the state con-
stitutions by degrees and thus to swallow by degrees all the
state judiciaries." Gerry of Massachusetts called it a "tyranny,"
and William Smith of South Carolina declared that "This con-
stant control of the supreme federal court over the adjudication
of the state courts would dissatisfy the people. '3 7
This last prediction, at least, proved to be sound. Partly
35. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) was the first case in
which an act of a state legislature was annulled. See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY 653 (1926).
36. Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933) ; E. BATES, THE STORY
OF THE SUPREME COURT 38 (chart. ed. 1962) ; C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 3 (1963).
37. For these and other expressions of opinion, see E. BATES, THE STORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT 39 (chart. ed. 1962).
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because of the unpopularity of this act the Federalists lost the
presidency in 1801.
Shortly after the Judiciary Act was enacted several suits
were filed against states by citizens of other states. The plain-
tiffs in all of these suits based their right to maintain such
actions on Article III of the Constitution 3 8 and on Section 13 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 which provided that the Supreme
Court should have jurisdiction over controversies "between a
state and citizens of other states."
One of the first such suits to be filed was entitled Chisholm
v. Georgia.39 There, two citizens of South Carolina, as executors
of a British creditor, sued the State of Georgia in the United
States Supreme Court for an alleged debt. The State of Georgia,
being jealous of its sovereignty as were all of the other states,
denied that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction and it refused
to plead. The Supreme Court, with John Jay as its first Chief
Justice, rendered judgment against the state, but Georgia still
refused to surrender its sovereignty and it refused to pay the
judgment. Soon after the decision was rendered a bill was intro-
duced in the Georgia Legislature providing that any federal
marshall or other person who attempted to execute the process
of the Court should be adjudged "guilty of felony and shall
suffer death, without benefit of clergy, by being hanged."40 No
process of any kind in that case was served on Georgia after
that bill was introduced.
Other suits of a similar nature were filed against Maryland,
New York, and Virginia, and these states reacted almost in the
same manner as Georgia had done. The circumstance which in-
furiated the states most was the fact that when the Constitution
was up for ratification the Federalist leaders had assured the
states that they could not be sued under that provision.41 Within
two days after a decision was rendered in Chisholm v. Georgia
a bill was introduced in Congress proposing an amendment to
the Constitution providing that the judicial power of the United
States did not extend to suits against a state by citizens of
another state. The bill was promptly passed and the amendment
was ratified by the states. It became the eleventh amendment.4 2
38. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, provides: "The Judicial Power shall extend to
all cases in Law and Equity, . . . to controversies ... 'between a state and citizens
of another state."
39. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1792).
40. E. BATES, THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 56 (chart. ed. 1962).
41. See, e.g., Statements by Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamil-
ton); Statements 'by Madison in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 533 (1861 ed.)
42. See discussion of this amendment in Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State
Docks Dep't, 311 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1963).
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The Judiciary Act was amended and revised in 1801, during
the last days of the administration of President John Adams. 43
Adams was a staunch Federalist, and he believed in a powerful
central government. In his bid for re-election in 1800 he was
defeated by Thomas Jefferson, who was a strong Anti-Feder-
alist, although the name of the party by that time had been
changed to the Republican Party, no relation to the present
party which bears that name. Jefferson was a firm believer in
state sovereignty, and his views thus were diametrically opposed
to those entertained by Adams.
Adams and the Federalist Congress wanted to perpetuate
Federalist control of the courts. In an effort to do so the lame
duck Congress, early in 1801 and shortly before Jefferson was
to be inaugurated, enacted the famous "Midnight Judges Bill,"
more formally referred to as the Judiciary Act of 1801. 44 This
statute substantially amended the original Judiciary Act. It
provided that on the death of the next justice of the Supreme
Court, a successor would not be appointed, but that the number
of justices thereafter would remain at five instead of six. This
provision obviously was designed to prevent incoming President
Jefferson from appointing a justice to succeed the seriously ill
and aging Justice Cushing. The act also relieved the justices
of the Supreme Court from the necessity of riding circuit or of
sitting as members of the circuit courts, a burdensome duty
which the members of the Supreme Court justifiably disliked.
The 1801 act also increased the number of circuits from three
to six, and it provided for the appointment by the president of
sixteen new circuit court judges to preside over these courts.
Also, in a separate act passed at the same time, forty-two new
Justices of the Peace were created for the District of Columbia,
all of whom were to be appointed by the president.
Immediately after this act was passed Adams proceeded to
appoint Federalists to fill these newly created judicial posi-
tions. Most of these appointments were made during the last
few days of his administration, many of them having been
made actually on the last day he was in office. Chief Justice
Rutledge resigned shortly before the end of Adams' term, thus
opening the way for Adams to make another important last
43. E. BATES, THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 81 (chart. ed. 1962) ; C.
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 4 (1963).
44. 2 Stat. 89. See also E. BATES, THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 81
(chart. ed. 1962) ; F. RODELL, NINE MEN 69 (1955).
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minute appointment. Adams promptly appointed his good friend
John Marshall to succeed Rutledge as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court. Marshall was a leader in the Federalist Party,
and he, like Adams, believed in a strong federal government.
He was serving as Secretary of State under Adams at the time
of his appointment.
Since many appointments were made by Adams during
his last days in office, the Secretary of State was unable to
deliver commissions to some of the appointees before Jefferson
was inaugurated. President Jefferson, immediately after his
inauguration, instructed his new Secretary of State, James
Madison, to withhold the delivery of commissions to some of
Adams' appointees. One of the commissions so withheld pur-
suant to Jefferson's instructions had been issued to William
Marbury who had been appointed to serve as a Justice of the
Peace. Marbury promptly instituted a mandamus suit in the
United States Supreme Court seeking to compel Secretary of
State Madison to issue and deliver his commission as Justice
of the Peace, and the famous case of Marbury v. Madison thus
was begun. 45
The position taken by the Secretary of State in that case was
that the Supreme Court did not have the right to issue a man-
damus to him. He conceded that Section 13 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 specifically gave that right to the Supreme Court,
but Madison contended that that section of the act was uncon-
stitutional since it went beyond the authority vested in the
Supreme Court by the Constitution. The question was squarely
presented to the Supreme Court, therefore, as to whether that
court could declare an act of Congress unconstitutional.
In 1802, shortly after Jefferson had stopped the issuance of
commissions to Adams' appointees, the new Republican Congress
enacted a law repealing Adams' Judiciary Act of 1801, thus
abolishing all of the new judgeships which had been created by
that act.46 President Adams, of course, had already appointed
many persons to fill these positions. The repealing act passed at
the beginning of Jefferson's Administration, if allowed to stand,
would have had the effect of putting these recently appointed
judges out of office. It also would have reinstated the old re-
quirement that justices of the Supreme Court must ride circuits
and sit as members of the circuit courts.
45. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
46. 2 Stat. 132.
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Immediately after Jefferson's repealing act was passed in
1802, it was attacked as being unconstitutional in the case of
Stuart v. Laird,4 7 which was then pending before the Supreme
Court. The argument was made in that case that since the new
judicial positions had been lawfully created by Congress in 1801,
and the judges had been appointed and commissioned to serve
during good behavior as provided in Article III of the Consti-
tution, the attempt by the new Congress to abolish those offices
by repealing the 1801 Act was unconstitutional. The Republican
Congress, knowing that all of the justices of the Supreme Court
were strong Federalists and that most of them had favored the
enactment of the 1801 Act, feared that the court would declare
the repealing act of 1802 unconstitutional, and thus permit the
newly appointed Federalist judges to remain in office. The Con-
gress undertook to forestall this anticipated unfavorable decision
by enacting a statute prohibiting the Supreme Court from con-
vening or rendering any decisions at all for fourteen months or
until February, 1803.48 The time set for the court to reconvene,
by coincidence, happened to be about the time when the term of
office to which Marbury had been appointed would expire.
Immediately after the court reconvened in 1803 arguments
were heard in the case of Marbury v. Madison,4 9 and less than
two weeks later Chief Justice Marshall, as the organ of the
court, handed down his famous decision, although the issue by
that time had become moot. The Court held in that case that
the Supreme Court did have the right to declare an act of Con-
gress unconstitutional, that Section 13 of the First Judiciary
Act passed by Congress was invalid as being in violation of the
Constitution, and that the Supreme Court did not have the power
to issue a writ of mandamus. Marbury, of course, never received
his commission.
The decision in Marbury v. Madison had no practical effect
insofar as the parties were concerned, because Marbury's term
of office had expired. But, regardless of its practical effect, it
ranks as the most important decision in all Supreme Court his-
tory, judged by its potency as a legal precedent." The Court
47. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
48. E. BATES, THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 90 (chart. ed. 1962) ; 1
C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 222 (1926).
49. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
50. See E. BATES, TILE STORY OF TIlE SUPREME COURT 87-94 (chart. ed.
1962) ; I. FRIBOURG, THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 17-29 (1965) ;
F. RODELL, NINE MEN 78-79 (1955) ; 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY 231-68 (1926).
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answered categorically one of the controversial questions relat-
ing to the reviewing power of the Supreme Court which the
Constitutional Convention and the Congress had failed to answer,
that is, whether that court could annul an act of Congress. It
was the first exercise by the Supreme Court of its controversial
veto power over Congress. It marked the first time that the
highest judicial tribunal, anywhere, had annulled an act of the
governing body which had the power to abolish and to regulate
the jurisdiction of the very court which rendered that decree.
Some regard the decision as establishing the power of
"judicial review," while others regard it as the usurpation of
power by the Supreme Court. In any event, the decision in that
case has never been overruled, and the Supreme Court continues
to exercise greater powers of review than does any other court
in existence.
Six days after the decision in Marbury v. Madison was
handed down, the Supreme Court also decided the case of Stuart
v. Laird,51 that being the litigation in which the constitutionality
of Jefferson's repealing act of 1802 was questioned. By the time
that case was submitted to the Supreme Court, the validity of
all three of the existing Judiciary Acts was being challenged.
Issues were raised as to the constitutionality of the original
Judiciary Act of 1789, the Amended Judiciary Act of 1801
adopted in Adams' lame duck session, and the 1802 repealing
act which was passed under Jefferson's administration. The
Supreme Court, to the delight of the Federalist leaders, held that
Jefferson's Repeal Act of 1802 was unconstitutional because it
purported to abolish six legally created circuit courts, and to
put out of office the judges of those courts, all of whom had
been appointed pursuant to the Constitution to hold office "dur-
ing good behavior." The court held that Adam's Judiciary Act
of 1801 was constitutional because it did not abolish any exist-
ing courts and it did not attempt to remove from office any
judge who had been consitutionally appointed to that office
during good behavior. And, finally, the court found that the
Original Judiciary Act of 1789 was unconstitutional, because
it provided that justices of the Supreme Court should sit as trial
judges on the circuit courts whereas the Constitution provided
that they were to have appellate jurisdiction only, but the court
went on to hold that "practice and acquiescence" under the
Judiciary Act of 1789 for several years had fixed its construc-
51. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
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tion and made it constitutional. Justice Patterson, as the organ
of the court, said:
"To this objection, which is of recent date, it is sufficient
to observe, that practice and acquiescence under it for a
period of several years, commencing with the organization
of the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has
indeed fixed the construction. It is a contemporary inter-
pretation of the most forcible nature. This practical exposi-
tion is too strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled.
Of course, the question is at rest, and ought not now to be
disturbed."' 2
The decision in Stuart v. Laird perpetuated Federalist con-
trol over the Supreme Court for several more years. Following
closely on the heels of Marbury v. Madison, it also firmly estab-
lished the authority of the Supreme Court to annul acts of Con-
gress, and that right has never been successfully challenged
since that time.
It has already been noted that the Judiciary Act of 1789,
with only a few exceptions, restricted a litigant's right to have
a case reviewed to a procedure similar to the common law writ
of error. As early as 1803, however, the absolute right of appeal
was granted in some cases, and later litigant was granted the
unqualified right to appeal from all final decisions of the
district courts to the courts of appeal, and the absolute right
to appeal in some cases to the Supreme Court. The discretionary
remedy of review by means of a writ of error also was retained
until 1928, when it was abolished. Since that time there have
been three methods of obtaining a review by the United States
Supreme Court, depending on the nature of the controversy.
They are: By means of the absolute right of appeal, by a writ
of certiorari which may be granted at the discretion of the court,
and by certification.53
The circuit courts of appeal were established by the Everts
Act in 189154 to relieve the Supreme Court of a hopeless backlog
of cases. The bill, as originally introduced and passed by the
House, provided that the old circuit courts were to be abolished
with the creation of these new courts. The Senate refused to
concur in the abolishment of the circuit courts, however, so the
52. Id. at 307.
53. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252-1258 (1964). See also H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL
Puocmss 159-65 (1962).
54. 26 Stat. 826.
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bill was amended to allow the circuit courts to continue. For the
next thirty years, there existed four tiers of courts in our
federal system: The district courts, the circuit courts, the circuit
courts of appeal and the Supreme Court. The circuit courts were
abolished when the Judicial Code of 1911 was adopted, 55 and
the jurisdiction of those courts was transferred to the district
courts. The title of the circuit courts of appeal was changed to
"courts of appeal" by the Revised Judicial Code of 1948.56
The creation of intermediate courts of appeal in 1891, and
the enlarging of the jurisdiction of those courts in 1911, relieved
the Supreme Court of some of its work load, but the relief
was not sufficient to enable it to keep up with its docket. The
"Judge's Bill" was enacted in 1925, therefore, which abolished
the right of direct appeal to the Supreme Court except in a
limited number of cases. 57 Since that time, although the right
of appeal to the Supreme Court does exist in some cases, gen-
erally the procedure available for obtaining a review by the
Supreme Court has been by application for a writ of certiorari.
There still exists the absolute right of appeal from decisions
of the district courts to the courts of appeal-5
Although the procedure for review authorized by the Judic-
iary Act of 1789 was limited almost exclusively to the common
law writ of error, later legislation abandoned that type of
remedy and instituted an absolute right of appeal which is
patterned on civil law procedures.
The authority of the reviewing court to review facts as
well as the law in appeals from non-jury cases has been recog-
nized consistently in federal court procedures, although the law
provides and jurisprudence establishes that findings of fact by
the trial judge will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.5 9
A different rule applies, however, in civil cases tried by jury.
Amendment 7 of our Federal Constitution provides that "No
fact tried by jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court
of the United States than according to the rules of the common
law." The United States Supreme Court has held that this
means that in a civil jury case which has been appealed, the
55. See Maris, The Federal Judicial System, in 12 MODERN FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE DIGEST 815, 817-18 (1960).
56. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1333 (1964).
57. 43 Stat. 936.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1964).
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 52.
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appellate court can review only questions of law."° It also has
held consistently up to this time that this amendment applies
only to federal courts and that it does not apply to state
courts.6
In Louisiana, our State Constitution authorizes appellate
courts to review the facts as well as the law in all civil cases,
even though tried by jury. 62 Some legal scholars believe, how-
ever, that recent rulings of the Supreme Court on other issues
indicate that the seventh amendment must now be applied in
state courts and that our state appellate courts can no longer
review facts in these cases. That conclusion is based on recent
holdings that because of the "due process of law" and "equal
protection of the laws" provisions of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the rights guaranteed in the first ten amendments must
now be applied to the states in state courts. 33
In a number of cases decided recently, however, the Supreme
Court and the United States Courts of Appeal have held that
the appellate review of facts found by a jury is permissible
if the suit involves a claim that certain fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution have been violated.6 4 In New
York Times v. Sullivan, for instance, a case tried by jury and
dealing with the right of freedom of speech, the Supreme Court
held that it was proper for it "to review the evidence to deter-
mine whether it could constitutionally support a judgment for
respondent." ' ,
Shortly thereafter in Associated Press v. Walker, it said:
"We think it better to face for ourselves the question
60. Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 372 U.S. 108 (1963) ; Rogers v. Mis-
souri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957) ; Senko v. La Crosse Dredging Corp., 352
U.S. 370 (1957) ; Gardner v. Capital Transit Co., 152 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 327 U.S. 795 (1946).
61. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) ; Hardware Dealers
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v. Glidden, 284 U.S. 151 (1931) ; Barron v. Bal-
timore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
62. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 29.
63. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Tehan v. United
States, 382 U.S. 406 (1966) ; Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) Esco-
bedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) ; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) School
District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) ; Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) ; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). See also
The Gitlow Doctrine Down to Date: 11, 54 A.B.A.J. 785 (1968).
64. Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) ; New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) Napue v. People, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) ; Niemotko
v. State, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) United States v. Thornburg, 111 F.2d 278 (8th
Cir. 1940).
65. 376 U.S. 254, 284-85 (1964). See also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967).
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whether there is sufficient evidence to support the finding
we would require."'' 6
And, in Niemotko v. State of Maryland, it ruled:
"In cases in which there is a claim of denial of rights
under the Federal Constitution, this Court is not bound
by the conclusions of lower courts, but will re-examine the
evidentiary basis on which those conclusions are founded." ''6
These rulings to the effect that facts found by a jury may
be re-examined and reversed by the appellate court have been
applied in only a limited number of cases, and they can hardly
be interpreted as overruling or materially changing the estab-
lished general rule that under the provisions of the seventh
amendment fact findings by a jury may not be reviewed in
federal courts.
It is conceivable that at some time in the future the Supreme
Court will decree that the seventh amendment must be applied
in state courts. If that occurs, such a ruling will bring about a
change in the laws of this state relating to appeals, and it will
restrict our appellate courts solely to a review of questions of
law in civil jury cases.
Attempts have been made from time to time to limit, restrict
or, curtail the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. About 1821,
for instance, the southern states became fearful of the Supreme
Court and they set out to limit its jurisdiction. One of the
many measures introduced in Congress to accomplish that pur-
pose was a bill proposing a constitutional amendment limiting
the terms of the justices to six years, without reappointment
except by agreement of both houses of Congress. Senator John-
son of Kentucky introduced a bill to remove from the Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction in cases involving an interpretation
of the Constitution, and to vest that appellate jurisdiction in the
Senate. Congressman Stevenson of Virginia introduced a resolu-
tion to repeal Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and thus
deprive the Supreme Court of most of the extensive powers of
review which the first Congress had vested in it. Several resolu-
tions to the same effect were introduced by other Congressmen.
A resolution submitted by Senator Johnson requiring the con-
currence of five out of the seven justices in constitutional cases
was reported favorably by the Committee on the Judiciary in
66. 388 U.S. 130, 158 (1967).
67. 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951).
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the Senate, but it failed when it came up for final vote. And,
in 1825 an unsuccessful attempt was made to "pack" the court.68
None of the above mentioned proposals was enacted into law.
Other attempts have been made from time to time to limit
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but most of
these also have failed, the notable exceptions being that the
appellate jurisdiction of that court was restricted by the 7th
and 11th Amendments of the Constitution. Congress has seldom
used the power vested in it by the Constitution to limit the
jurisdiction of the court. Parts of the Judiciary Act have been
decreed to be unconstitutional, of course, and it has been
amended from time to time. It eventually was superseded by the
Judicial Code of 1911.09 The jurisdiction of our federal courts,
however, has actually been greatly expanded and enlarged
through the years rather than restricted.
The Supreme Court at various times has been composed of
as few as five justices and as many as ten.7 0 There have been
nine members of the Court since 1869. From the very beginning
the Court has been called upon to render decisions which have
had far-reaching effects, such as the early cases of McCulloch
v. Maryland,71 Gibbons v. Ogden72 the Dartmouth College
case, 7 3 the Dred Scott Decision7 4 and others which have already
been mentioned. Of great importance also are the more recent
cases involving the integration of our public schools,7" the School
Prayer cases,7 6 Gideon v. Wainwright, 71 the EscobedoTs and
Miranda 7 cases and others.
A number of proposed changes in our laws relating to
appeals are currently being debated by legislators and legal
scholars. One such proposal is designed to correct the disparity
68. E. BATES, THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 126 (chart. ed. 1962) ; 1
C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 652-85 (1926).
69. 36 Stat. 1168, § 297.
70. See H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 156 (1962).
71. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See also E. BATES, THE STORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT 119-23 (chart. ed. 1962); I. FRIBOURO, THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 30-44 (1965).
72. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
73. The Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518 (1819).
74. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
75. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
76. See, e.g., Chamberlin v. Dade County Board of Public Instruction, 377
U.S. 402 (1964) ; School District of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, Md. &
Pa., 374 U.S. 203 (1963) ; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) ; West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943).
77. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
78. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
79. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
[Vol. XXIX
THE RIGHT OF APPEAL
and inequality of sentences.80 The discussions centering around
these proposals have led to a movement which is now underway
to vest appellate courts with the power to review and to decrease
or increase sentences.
Prior to 1891 the United States Circuit Courts had the
power to review and change sentences, and they exercised that
power. 1 On at least one occasion since that time a federal appel-
late court has set aside a legally imposed sentence solely because
it concluded that the punishment was too severe under the
facts and circumstances presented. 82 Generally, however, there
can be no appellate review and modification of a sentence in
our federal courts. In at least thirteen states, however, the ap-
pellate review and modification of sentences is authorized.83
The military courts of the United States have always had that
power. And the English Court of Criminal Appeals has had the
authority to review and change sentences since 1907.4 The
United States, in fact, is the only nation in the free world
where a sentence imposed by one judge is not subject to review
by a higher court.8 5
At least eight bills are pending in Congress at this time
authorizing the appellate review and modification of sentences
in federal courts. A special committee of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States, after conducting surveys which in-
cluded responses to questionnaires from federal judges, has gone
on record as favoring the appellate review of sentences.8 6
In 1967 the Advisory Committee on Sentencing and Review
of the American Bar Association, after conducting a fourteen
80. See generally D. KABLEN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
ENGLAND (1963) ; Brewster, Appellate Review of Sentences, 40 F.R.D. 79 (1965);
George, An Unsolved Problem: Comparative Sentencing Techniques, 45 A.B.A.J.
250 (1959); Seminar and Institute on Disparity of Sentences, 30 F.R.D. 401
(1961) ; Youngdahl, Institute on Sentencing, 35 F.R.D. 381 (1964).
81. 20 Stat. 354 (1879) ; Kaufman, Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D.
249, 259 (1962).
82. United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960).
83. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1717 (1956) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-
194, 51-195, 15-196 (Supp. 1965) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.52 (Supp. 1966);
HAWAII REV. LAWS § 212-14 (Supp. 1965) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 117-3(e)
(Smith-Hurd 1964); IOWA CODE ANN. § 793.18 (1950); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26, §§ 2141-2144 (Supp. 1966) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, §§ 132-138 (1966) ;
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, §§ 28A-28D (1959) ; NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2308
(1964); N.Y. CODE CRIM. P. §§ 543, 764; ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 138.050, 168.090
(1963) (repl. part) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2711 (1955).
84. 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, § 3(c) (1907) ; Kaufman, Appellate Review of Sentences,
32 F.R.D. 249, 260 (1962).
85. Kaufman, Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249, 260-61 (1962).
86. Id. at 263.
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month study, recommended legislation of that type for federal
and state courts. 8
7
The principal arguments advanced by the proponents of
the measures are that appellate review will correct excessively
harsh sentences, that it will eliminate the great disparity which
now exists in sentences, and that it will induce greater respect
for the laws. The opponents of the legislation argue that the
trial judge is in a better position than is the appellate court
to impose a proper sentence, that the appellate review of sen-
tences will result in the standardizing of sentences which all
criminologists say is not desirable, and that such a procedure
would inundate appellate courts with frivolous appeals.
In view of the growing sentiment in favor of the appellate
review of sentences it would not be surprising if legislation
to that effect should be enacted by Congress, permitting such
reviews in federal courts.
Another current problem which may provoke changes in
some of our appellate procedures relates to the many devices
which are now being used to obtain reviews of sentences long
after the delays for appealing have expired. These procedures
are referred to generally as post conviction remedies. The one
most frequently used is the writ of habeas corpus, but others
sometimes are the writ of error coram nobis, the motion for
new trial on newly discovered evidence, the motion to vacate
the sentence, the motion to correct an illegal sentence, the motion
to withdraw a plea of guilty, and the motion to reopen an appeal.
In many of these cases the convicted person, long after the
sentence has been imposed and the trial procedures have been
completed, is permitted to raise in another procedure, and fre-
quently in another court, the same questions which were or
should have been raised on his original appeal."" In some cases
87. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING To APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES
(1967).
88. See generally Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) ; Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) ; Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1963) ; United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954); Dowd v.
United States, 340 U.S. 206 (1951) ; Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir.
1964) ; Collins v. Walker, 329 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1964) ; See Meador, Accommo-
dating State Criminal Procedure and Federal Postconviction Review, 50 A.B.A.J.
928 (1964) and authorities cited therein.
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fact-findings of the court or jury are reviewed and judgments
are set aside at least partially on factual issues.
The great number of cases which have been filed recently
by parties seeking post conviction remedies has compelled many
states to adopt special legislation to accommodate them. At least
twenty-one states, as well as Congress, have enacted laws mak-
ing special provisions for this type of remedy. 9
In view of the many types of post conviction remedies which
appear to be available to the convicted person, a case which
results in such a conviction now seldom reaches a point where
it can be said to have been finally concluded. Revisions of our
procedural laws, both state and federal, are needed to provide
a more standardized procedure for seeking post conviction
remedies, and to set time limits within which this type of relief
may be sought. It is hoped that most of these remedies eventu-
ally will be incorporated into our appellate procedures and that
those which cannot be disposed of by appeal will be subjected
to the requirement that they be litigated and disposed of before
the case is finally determined on appeal. In any event, a time
limit should be fixed for the disposition of these post conviction
remedies so that at some point in the litigation the judgment
rendered may actually become final.9°
A proposal is being urged that our appellate procedures be
changed to provide for an automatic appeal in some criminal
cases, particularly in those which involve capital punishment.
A modification of some of our procedural laws may be needed
89. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 35 (Supp. 1963) ; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2001
-13-2027 (1956) ; Anii. R. CRIM. P. 1 (1965) ; COLO. R. CRIM. P. 35 (1962);
DEL. R. CRiM. P. 35 (1953) ; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1 (1963) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, §§ 122-1-122-7 (1964); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1057 (1964); Ky. R. CRIM.
P. 11:42 (1964) ; ME. R. CRIM. P. 35(b), following tit. 14 ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
(Supp. 1966) MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645 (Supp. 1965); Mo. SUP. CT. R.
27.26 (1953); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-3001-29-3004 (Cum. Supp. 1965); N.J.
C. R. 3:10A (Supp. 1965) ; N.Y. Proposed Act §§ 517-28, 880-87; LEG. Doc.
65[L] (1959); N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217-15-222 (1965); OHIO REV. CODE§§ 2953.1-2953.24 (Supp. 1966) ; ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 138.510-138.680 (1963) ; Pa.
Laws No. 554 (1965) ; UTAH STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 7131-7137 (Law Pamphlet
1966) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 7-408.1-7-408.8 (1963); 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1964) ; See generally Post-Conviction Remedies, in A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1967).
90. See Badger, A Judicial Cul-de-Sac: Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 50 A.B.A.J. 629 (1964).
1969]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
now in order to enable indigent litigants to obtain a transcript
of the trial proceedings for the purpose of appeal. The dockets
in some of our appellate courts have become so heavy that sev-
eral proposals have been made to limit appeals to certain types
of cases and to those which involve more than a fixed minimum
sum. Other amendments to our laws relating to appeals are
being discussed now, and new proposals for the improvement
of our appellate procedures doubtless will be submitted from
time to time as conditions change or as the need for them be-
comes apparent.
A review of this kind emphasizes the need for us to con-
stantly study and revise our judicial procedures. And, I think
it also emphasizes the importance of preserving the right of
appeal.
The judiciary is in a sense the guardian of the law and of
the personal and property rights of our citizens. It is much
further removed from the political arena than are administra-
tive and legislative agencies. It is made up of men who are
chosen for their ability and integrity, and these men are pro-
vided with a measure of tenure and security which is designed
to insulate them from political pressure and stresses.
The absolute right of a litigant to have his case reviewed by
a higher court gives him a little more assurance that he will
not become the victim of human error, however sincere. It re-
lieves him completely from the fear of being subjected to the
whim or abuse of a tyrant. It gives time for sober second
thoughts as to the issues which are presented, and it permits
the case to be reconsidered in a calmer atmosphere, after the
heat of battle is over. And, a review on appeal enlists the think-
ing and deliberation of more than a single mind in determining
those issues. It is true that the exercise of the right of appeal
delays the final disposition of the case, but when important per-
sonal or property rights are involved the greater assurance that
justice will be accomplished in that case and in others more
than offsets the injury occasioned by the delay.
Our procedures for administering justice will require and
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unquestionably will be subjected to many more changes. I be-
lieve, however, that the absolute right of appeal is truly a funda-
mental safeguard of justice, and I sincerely hope that none of
the changes which we may expect in the future will have the
effect of impairing that right. Thomas Jefferson stated that the
object of our judicial system was "Equal and exact justice to all
men of whatever state or persuasion." We can come nearer ap-
proaching that objective by preserving the civil law concept of
the right of appeal.
